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ABSTRACT With the wrap-up of the S-400 deal with Russia in December 2017, 
critics argue that Turkey is caught between a rock and a hard place due to 
the adamant opposition of its NATO allies, the United States in particu-
lar, which has threatened Ankara with imposing severe sanctions. Would 
this be the correct representation of the situation at hand? Does it make 
any sense for Turkey to engage Russia, an archrival nation, to enhance the 
security of the country? Is the S-400 deal worth the risk of alienating the 
allied nations whose projected sanctions may have wide-ranging political, 
economic and military repercussions? With these questions in mind, this 
paper will try to shed light on the specifics of the S-400 deal that make one 
think that it may indeed make sense for Turkey to bear the brunt of engag-
ing Russia. In the same vein, the paper will assess the impact of the S-400 
deal on Turkey’s defense industries. The paper will also present the author’s 
conception of the current “international political non-order” as an under-
lying factor behind the deal. Finally, the paper will suggest that the S-400 
deal must be approached from a wider perspective so as to grasp the extent 
of the service it has done in bolstering Turkey’s military-industrial complex.
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Two main questions raised by most defense analysts, especially in West-ern countries and also at home with respect to Turkey’s decision to buy the S-400 air defense system from Russia are: “Does it make sense?” 
and “Is it worth the risk?” These questions are simple, yet carry massive im-
plications regarding the criticism to which Turkey has been subject over the 
last several years, and thus the challenges that lie ahead in connection with 
its decision. 
The essence of the criticisms leveled against Turkey emanates from it being a 
long-time NATO ally, one that undertook extremely tough and risky respon-
sibilities throughout the Cold War period in defense of the Western alliance 
against the threat posed by Soviet Russia. It may seem therefore strange for a 
NATO country like Turkey to go for a strategic defense procurement policy 
with a country like Russia, which is still treated as the main rival in the contin-
gency plans of the Alliance. Indeed, NATO’s long-term hostile stance toward 
Russia has toughened recently, especially since its illegal annexation of Crimea 
in March 2014 that brought to a halt the constructive and cooperative bilat-
eral relations of the post-Cold War era within the context of the NATO-Russia 
Council that was created in 1997. 
Nevertheless, approaching the S-400 issue from such a dire perspective would 
be highly misleading in the sense that it could create the impression that Tur-
key has made a radical decision as a result of a profound shift in its mainstream 
foreign and security policies. The story is not as clear cut. Turkey’s decision to 
buy the S-400s is the outcome of a long and exhausting journey, full of hope 
and despair. Over the last three decades, Turkey has sought out the best air 
defense capability to be deployed all over the country. 
Against this background, this article will discuss and analyze the timeline 
of one of Turkey’s most critical—and most criticized—defense procurement 
projects with a particular emphasis on its hopefully constructive and yet 
potentially damaging impact on the future of the fledgling Turkish defense 
industries. 
Accordingly, in the first section, a brief account will be given about how Turkey 
got to the point of signing defense contracts, first with a Chinese firm and then 
with a Russian firm, after having been involved in extended and tiresome de-
liberations for years in efforts to procure the Patriot air defense system from its 
ally, the United States. This section will also highlight the arguments and count-
er-arguments that Turkey and its NATO allies have leveled against each other 
over the logic and feasibility of buying non-Western air defense systems, given 
Turkey’s status as a country that occupies a significant place within the West-
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ern security structure, and about the 
implications of such a move for the 
security of the entire alliance. 
The second section will highlight 
the controversy over Ankara’s choice 
of non-Western air defense systems 
that sparked crises between Tur-
key and its NATO allies, the United 
States in particular, which prompted 
the U.S. Congress to pass legislation 
to impose tough sanctions on the 
Turkish Armed Forces as well as on the leading Turkish companies operating 
in the military-industrial complex in Turkey that have developed longstand-
ing collaborative defense projects with their American partners, such as the 
production of the F-16 fighter aircraft, SOM cruise missiles (Satha Atılan Orta 
Menzilli Mühimmat) and a large variety of electronic warfare products. 
The third section will shed light on the specifics of the S-400 deal that indicate 
it may make sense for Turkey to bear the brunt of engaging Russia in a highly 
strategically important defense procurement policy despite the risk of the de-
terioration of its relations with its Western allies, apparently not only in the 
military domain but also in the political and economic domains. 
The fourth section will assess the impact of the S-400 dispute on the recent 
developments and achievements taking place in the Turkish defense industries 
and will demonstrate how all of these play out in the context of bolstering the 
country’s capacity and capability in these respects.
The article will conclude with remarks about the need to approach the S-400 
dispute from a higher level and a much wider perspective by sketching a pic-
ture of the current situation in international politics where no dominant par-
adigm exists, unlike the Cold War period in which the behaviors of the actors 
on the world stage (states as well as non-states) at the regional and global level 
were constrained.
Turkey’s Attempts to Establish an Air Defense System
It goes without saying that Turkey’s geographical location in the vicinity of 
volatile regions and in a rather hostile environment requires the deployment of 
air defense systems all over the country against the threat posed by the missile 
and air force capabilities in the hands of a number of countries in its strategic 
environment.1
Turkey’s decision to buy the 
S-400s is the outcome of a long 
and exhausting journey, full 
of hope and despair. Over the 
last three decades, Turkey has 
sought out the best air defense 




Turkey’s existing air defense systems, con-
sisting of Stingers, Rapiers and Hawks, not 
only have limited ranges (i.e., short and me-
dium), but also limited lifespans, and they 
are aging fast. Turkey’s Nike Hercules mis-
siles, which were deployed around the city 
of Istanbul during the Cold War years, have 
relatively longer ranges of about 140 km, but 
they cannot be relied upon anymore, and 
many have been sent to retirement already. 
Thus, Turkey’s airspace is not being pro-
tected by proper land-based air defense sys-
tems, nor is the vast territory of 783,562 km2 
beneath it, where 84 million Turks live.  In 
lieu of an effective land-based system, Tur-
key’s airspace is patrolled by Turkish Air Force units consisting of F-16 fighter 
aircraft, which carry air-to-air missiles, as well as refueling (Aerial Tanker) air-
craft and an early warning system (i.e., AWACS), with a view to achieving active 
protection against potential missile attacks and violations of Turkish airspace 
by enemy aircraft. A certain proportion of these patrolling missions are carried 
out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which have recently entered the Turk-
ish Air Force inventory.2 Nevertheless, UAVs are far less effective than a land-
based system. Turkey is, therefore, in dire need of deploying a proper air defense 
structure that would provide consistent coverage all over the country in order to 
meet the fundamental requirements of being a sovereign state such as protect-
ing its population and its territorial integrity in a rather hostile environment.3
Hence, erecting an elaborate air defense capability has long been a priority for 
Turkish politicians, diplomats and the military, and it has always been on the 
agenda of Turkish-American relations, especially since the temporary deploy-
ment of the U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense systems, namely ‘Patriots,’ during 
the first Iraq war in 1991. 
Since then, Turkish authorities have been more than willing to procure this 
equipment at a fair value and deploy it permanently in Turkey, particularly in 
regions neighboring the Middle East. Despite extended negotiations, however, 
no consensus could be found in order to go ahead with a joint project. Turkey’s 
desire back in the late 1990s was to have a share in the development of the ballis-
tic missile defense technology, which was not very welcome by the United States.
A similar situation was experienced in the triangular relations among Turkey, 
the United States and Israel with respect to cooperation on the development 
and eventual deployment of the Arrow-II air defense system. While the Amer-
The lack of an effective air 
defense system in Turkey 
was felt even more keenly 
when Syria plunged into 
civil war in March 2011; 
this eventually led, among 
other things, to a reversal 
of the then gradually 
improving bilateral 
relations between Ankara 
and Damascus
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icans put the blame on the Israelis as being the ones who did not want to share 
this new and sensitive technology with Turkey, Israelis pronounced almost ex-
actly the same views about the attitude of their American counterparts. All in 
all, the project was shelved, at least from Turkey’s perspective, and has actually 
never come to fruition to date, due to the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli rela-
tions in the late 2000s.4
Nonetheless, Turkey’s quest to develop an elaborate air defense capacity con-
tinued during the second half of the 2000s, as Ankara widened the scope of 
potential suppliers to include new countries such as China, Russia and the 
NATO allies, namely France and Italy. Turkey issued a call in 2009 for the 
procurement of a ‘Long-range Air and Missile Defense System,’ dubbed T-LO-
RAMIDS, and collected offers in 2010.5
The lack of an effective air defense system in Turkey was felt even more keenly 
when Syria plunged into civil war in March 2011; this eventually led, among 
other things, to a reversal of the then gradually improving bilateral relations 
between Ankara and Damascus.6 This incident revived the need for taking 
swift measures to deploy a permanent air defense structure in the country vis-
à-vis the growing threat perceived from the ballistic and cruise missile capabil-
ities in the arsenals of its neighboring states. 
Based on the lessons learned from earlier attempts in the 1990s and 2000s, the 
prevailing view among Turkish authorities was, this time, to acquire an elabo-
rate air defense capability on condition that:
• The system would provide an effective air defense shelter for Turkey against 
the threat of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as military aircraft;
• The first set of batteries could be deployed and become operational within 
a short span of time after the signing of the purchase agreement;
• The supplier firm would agree to share the technology with Turkey to allow 
co-production of the system, including its advanced versions in the near 
future;
• The price would be affordable.
The U.S. firms Raytheon and Lockheed Martin responded to the call with Pa-
triots, while the Chinese firm China Precision Machinery Import-Export Cor-
poration (CPMIEC) made its offer with the FD-2000 (the export version of 
HQ-9), and the Russian firm Rosoboroneksport offered the S-300. Later, the 
Franco-Italian consortium Eurosam offered the SAMP/T.7
The outcome of the bid would soon reveal the divergent approaches to Tur-
key’s desire to establish an effective air defense capability that was also though 
to enhance the security of its allies by achieving interoperability between the 
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NATO-wide air defense structure, also 
known as the ‘Missile Shield’ and the 
T-LORAMIDS. Experts and analysts 
did not miss a chance to debate whether 
it would be a wise decision for Turkey 
to spend billions of dollars while there 
would soon be a NATO project under-
way that would take care of defending 
the allies against a spectrum of airborne 
threats originating from enemy terri-
tories. Moreover, much to the Turks’ 
chagrin, came the swift and adamant 
opposition of the allied nations that 
would further complicate and prolong 
the whole process.
The Controversy over Turkey’s Choice of Non-Western Air Defense 
Systems
The Chinese firm CPMIEC, which had offered the FD-2000 air defense sys-
tem, came to the fore with a promise for early delivery of the batteries as well 
as a price that was considerably lower those that of the Russian S-300, the 
American Patriots and the Franco-Italian SAMP/T. 
Yet most of Turkey’s allies in the West, the United States, in particular, were 
quick to react harshly to Ankara’s pick among the bidders on the grounds that 
the Chinese system would not be compatible with the ‘Missile Shield’ that was 
being erected across the Alliance territory, and with Turkey’s major contribu-
tion of a radar site in the Kürecik village near the city of Malatya in the south-
eastern part of the country. 
Critics of Turkey’s decision to go ahead with the Chinese firm, from both in-
side and outside the country, argued that the FD-2000 air defense system, if 
deployed, would seriously jeopardize the integrity of NATO’s sensitive com-
mand, control and communication systems as well as its intelligence collecting 
capability.8 These criticisms also emphasized that the Chinese firm CPMIEC 
was subject to sanctions from the United States. 
Turkish political and military authorities tried hard to convince their peers in 
Western capitals and military headquarters that it would be technically pos-
sible to find effective solutions to prevent such scenarios from occurring. But 
the political climate was not at all conducive to reaching a consensus between 
the parties. 
Experts and analysts did 
not miss a chance to debate 
whether it would be a wise 
decision for Turkey to spend 
billions of dollars while 
there would soon be a NATO 
project underway that would 
take care of defending the 
allies against a spectrum of 
airborne threats originating 
from enemy territories
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While the Chinese deal was still on the negotiation table, the ever-increasing 
pressure exerted on Turkey by its allies caused a certain degree of reluctance in 
Ankara’s attitude to finalize the deal, which in turn caused the Chinese firm to 
withdraw its offer. This development led to a new round of talks between Tur-
key and the other contenders to renew their offers, bearing in mind the factors 
that had made them fail in the previous round. 
This time, the Russian firm Rosoboroneksport stood out with its S-400 Triumf 
missile system. Turkish and Russian authorities conducted negotiations during 
2016 and 2017 that culminated in the signing of an agreement on December 27, 
2017. Criticisms voiced by politicians, diplomats and civil and military experts 
from the allied countries, as well as from within the country with respect to Tur-
key’s choice of the Russian firm were no less severe than those pronounced only 
two years before when the Chinese offer was on the negotiation table. Moreover, 
some of the allies, the United States being at the forefront, went beyond the 
limits of diplomatic niceties by issuing openly threatening statements, implying 
that they would impose severe military and economic sanctions should Turkey 
go forward and finalize the procurement of the Russian air defense system.
The S-400 deal raised a number of concerns ranging from the technical aspects 
of military cooperation within NATO to broader political considerations. 
Some argued that the S-400 issue increased the possibility that Russia could 
take advantage of U.S.-Turkey friction to undermine the NATO alliance. For 
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NATO Military Committee, voiced 
concerns about the possibility that 
Russian personnel helping operate 
an S-400 system in Turkey could gain 
significant intelligence on NATO as-
sets stationed in the country.9
Similarly, in May 2018, during a press 
briefing, a State Department spokes-
person said, “Under NATO and un-
der the NATO agreement... you’re 
only supposed to buy… weapons and 
other materiel that are interoperable 
with other NATO partners. We don’t 
see [an S-400 system from Russia] as being interoperable.”10 Moreover, in June 
2018, Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell, who spoke at a foreign rela-
tions subcommittee hearing at the U.S. Senate, explained that the United States 
would implement sanctions against Turkey through “Section 231 of the Coun-
tering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.” Mitchell also said that 
Ankara’s decision to purchase the Russian missiles would lead Washington to 
cancel further delivery of F-35 stealth fighters.11
Notwithstanding these and other harsh criticisms coming from the allies, in 
September 2018, the Secretary-General of NATO consistently  underlined 
that “decisions on acquisition of military capabilities is a national decision, 
but what is important for NATO is interoperability, that the different systems 
can work together.”12 However, in November 2018, the “Unclassified Execu-
tive Summary” of the “FY19 NDAA Sec 1282 Report” published by the U.S. 
Department of Defense on the “Status of the U.S. Relationship with the Repub-
lic of Turkey” in its section on the “Impact of Turkey’s S-400 Acquisition” 
stated that “the U.S. Government has made clear to the Turkish Government 
that purchasing the S-400 would have unavoidable negative consequences for 
US-Turkey bilateral relations, as well as Turkey’s role in NATO, including:
• Potential sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adver-
saries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA);
• Banning of Turkish participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Pro-
gram (both aircraft acquisition and industrial workshare);
• Banning of potential future U.S. arms transfers to Turkey, and risk of losing 
broader bilateral defense industrial cooperation;
• Reduction in NATO interoperability in regards to Turkey;
• The risk of new vulnerabilities from Turkey’s increased dependence on Rus-
sia, including sanctioned Russian defense entities, for sophisticated mili-
tary equipment.
While the Chinese deal was 
still on the negotiation table, 
the ever-increasing pressure 
exerted on Turkey by its allies 
caused a certain degree of 
reluctance in Ankara’s attitude 
to finalize the deal, which in 
turn caused the Chinese firm 
to withdraw its offer
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The report also stated that “Turkish acquisition programs that could be affected 
include but are not limited to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Patriot Air and 
Missile Defense System, CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopter, UH-60 Black 
Hawk utility helicopter, and the F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft,” and that the U.S. 
administration would reassess Turkey’s continued participation as one of the 
eight partner nations should they continue with their purchase of the S-400.13 
Turkey’s Choice of the S-400: “Does it Make Sense?” and “Is it Worth 
the Risks?”
The bulk of criticisms in the West against Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Rus-
sia originates mainly from the deal’s political and military implications due 
to the increasing degree of rapprochement between Turkey, a NATO ally, and 
Russia, NATO’s long-standing archrival, perceived from the allies’ perspective 
as a significant threat to the Euro-Atlantic security and defense architecture, 
especially in the aftermath of its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
Local critics in Turkey, on the other hand, questioned the political, economic 
and military implications of the deal, basically on two grounds, one of which is 
whether the Russian deal makes sense in such a way that it would help to solve 
Turkey’s need for deploying an elaborate air defense system, and the other is 
whether the whole controversy is worth the risk of alienating the NATO allies 
and being subject to the severe military and economic sanctions of the United 
States.14
Does it Make Sense?
A number of experts confirm that the S-400 air defense system has some 
specifications that provide advantages in comparison to its rivals. Particular 
strengths of the S-400 system include its extended reach, its flexible ability to 
strike at different targets (primarily aircraft, but also cruise and ballistic mis-
siles to a degree) and its sophisticated sensors, which Russia claims include 
some anti-stealth capability. The S-400s’ ranges allow them to target key enemy 
enabler aircraft, such as valuable aerial refueling tankers and airborne early 
warning and control aircraft. Their flexible targeting capabilities mean they 
can defend against multiple different types of threats and attacks.15
The S-400 Triumph air defense system integrates a multifunction radar, auton-
omous detection and targeting systems, anti-aircraft missile systems, launch-
ers and a command and control center. The system can engage all types of 
aerial targets, including aircraft, UAVs and ballistic and cruise missiles within 
a range of 400 km at an altitude of up to 30 km. The system can simultaneously 
engage 36 targets. The S-400 is capable of firing three types of missiles to create 
a layered defense. The first missile inducted for the system was the 48N6DM 
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(48N6E3), which is an improved variant of the 48N6M with a more powerful 
propulsion system. The missile can destroy airborne targets within a range of 
250 km. The 40N6 missile has a claimed range of 400 km and uses active ra-
dar homing to intercept air targets at great distances. The S-400 Triumph also 
launches 9M96E and 9M96E2 medium range ground-to-air missiles. Designed 
for direct impact, the missiles can strike fast-moving targets such as fighter air-
craft with a high hit probability. The maximum range of the 9M96 missile is 
120 km. The radar of the S-400 can detect and track aircraft, rotorcraft, cruise 
missiles, guided missiles, drones and ballistic rockets within a distance of 600 
km. It can simultaneously track up to 300 targets.16
The Patriot (PAC-3), on the other hand, is a long-range, all-altitude, all-weather 
air defense system. It is equipped with a track-via-missile (TVM) guidance sys-
tem. Midcourse correction commands are transmitted to the guidance system 
from the mobile engagement control center. The Patriot has increased effec-
tiveness against tactical ballistic, cruise missiles and advanced aircraft through 
the use of advanced hit-to-kill technology thanks to its guidance system that 
enables target destruction through the kinetic energy released by hitting the 
target head-on. The radar system of the Patriot has a range of up to 100 km, the 
capacity to track up to 100 targets and can provide missile guidance data for up 
to nine missiles simultaneously.17
Based on this brief comparison of the fundamental features of the two ad-
vanced air defense systems, it wouldn’t be wrong to argue that “in the hands of 
The S-400 air 
defense system 
from Russia is 
activated for 
testing at the 
Turkish Air Force’s 
Mürted Air Base 
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competent and well-trained crews, the S-400 can inflict significant damage on 
an adversary.”18 Hence, given the four battalions of the S-400 that are report-
edly purchased and the extent of the area each one is capable of covering, the 
strategic locations of major cities in Turkey as well as selected military installa-
tions, critical infrastructure and industrial sites could be effectively protected. 
The mere presence of the system would enhance Turkey’s overall capabili-
ties for deterrence and defense, especially if one takes into consideration the 
heightened tension in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean stemming 
from deep divergences between Turkey and the other littoral states, Greece in 
particular, over a number of issue areas such as the continental shelf and ex-
clusive economic zones, not to mention the territorial waters dispute. In such 
a strained context, contingencies that involve a potential airborne surprise at-
tack by Greece on Turkey are no longer seen as routine intellectual exercises or 
professional training simulations for high-ranking officers by a growing num-
ber of security experts in the country.
Another factor that underlines the need for an effective air defense capabil-
ity, especially around strategic locations, is the attempted coup in Turkey in 
July 2016 by certain elements in the Turkish Armed Forces who have been 
identified as members of a religious cult, namely the Fetullahcı Terör Örgütü 
(FETÖ). During the coup attempt, FETÖ members reportedly used 35 mili-
tary aircraft, 24 of which were F-16s taking off from various airfields across 
the country and refueled by a tanker aircraft taking off from the Incirlik base. 
These aircraft were used to bombard a number of strategic sites including the 
Grand National Assembly and the Presidential Palace, which were defenseless 
against a surprise airborne attack of such a scale.19 Many have labeled this inci-
dent “Turkey’s 9/11,” an act of terrorism that no one in the country would even 
fathom happening again.
Alongside these perilous developments, there are also serious ongoing conflicts 
in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood in the Middle East and the Caucasus, 
such as the civil war in Syria, acute instability in Iraq, popular unrest and the ex-
plosive political situation in Lebanon, Iran’s controversial nuclear and ballistic 
missile program and the Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
all of which may influence the extent of the threats to Turkey’s national sover-
eignty and territorial integrity perceived by the authorities in Ankara. 
The S-400 deal raised a number of concerns 
ranging from the technical aspects of military 




Considering such realities, one can easily observe that Turkey has a tough 
neighborhood in which to live. While Turkish decision makers may seem to 
have ‘rushed’ or ‘insisted’ on acquiring an effective air defense capability as 
soon as possible, despite the military, economic, political risks put forward 
by critics, it is important to note that the deal was signed and sealed back in 
December 2017 at a time of extreme security concerns felt by the Turkish Gov-
ernment and the general populace alike.
Is it Worth the Risk?
One concern raised by the critics of the S-400 deal with Russia from the onset 
was whether the whole controversy is worth the risk of alienating the allies 
and facing severe sanctions from the United States, which stands out as the key 
arms and technology supplier to Turkey.
Amid all this debate, both at home and abroad, as to whether Turkey would 
insist on going ahead with its decision to buy the S-400s, President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan put an end to the public discourse in February 2019 by telling 
journalists that the purchase of the Russian air defense system was a “done 
deal.”20
Turkish authorities have underlined the fact that the S-400 system would be 
used in ‘stand-alone’ mode, meaning separately from the NATO command 
control structure with a view to eliminating the risks and the complaints that 
have been voiced in the West and at home about the possibility of the leakage 
of sensitive information to Russia. 
This decision, however, regardless of its pronounced objectives, may carry the 
risk of limiting the extent of military cooperation and displaying solidarity 
with the allies in times of crisis due to the fact that they may not wish to deploy 
their airborne units on Turkish bases for fear of being hit by friendly fire from 
the Turkish S-400s should the system prove unable to identify friend from foe 
during an air battle.
To mitigate such concerns, Turkish authorities expect the Russian supplier 
to allow, in the delivery of the second batch of the battalions, the installation 
of a kit on the command control system, which will be produced by Turkey 
with software prepared by Turkish engineers, in order to integrate them to the 
Mode 5 Transponder that Turkey uses in coordination with its NATO allies 
for controlling the airspace, recognizing the air picture and identifying friends 
and foes in the air traffic.
While there is a lack of certainty about whether Russia will live up to its com-
mitment to enable the S-400 to have such specifications, there are reports that 
Russia has already included a system (i.e., the interrogator) built to NATO 
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standards to distinguish between friendly 
and hostile aircraft on the S-400 system it 
has sold to Turkey. The same report claims 
that the actual coded waveforms that this 
“identification friend-or-foe system” (IFF) 
uses are kept secure within an attached but 
separate Turkish-made cryptologic system 
to which the Russians do not have direct 
access.21
Relatedly, Russia’s  Gazeta  newspaper pub-
lished a report in December 2019 saying 
that Turkey successfully tested the IFF sys-
tem during an initial evaluation of one of its 
S-400s. According to the report, two F-16s, one F-4 and a helicopter were con-
stantly in the air for eight hours with refueling in the air.22 The Gazeta’s story 
also says that the interrogator that Russia built for Turkey’s S-400s conforms 
to NATO’s Mk-XII IFF system requirement as defined by a set of standards 
known as Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4193. Turkey plans to re-
fit its S-400s with its own equipment as soon it is ready. It is still not clear, 
however, if the hybrid Russian-Turkish system actually meets the full array of 
applicable NATO standards, even if it is technically STANAG 4193 compliant. 
It’s not clear either whether other members of the Alliance would be willing to 
trust the safety of their aircraft during combined operations to a Russian-built 
system.23
The technical and technological dimensions of the interoperability of the Rus-
sian S-400s and the American Patriots aside, authorities in the United States 
have serious concerns about the ability of the radar of the S-400 battalions that 
will be deployed in Turkey to collect data on the F-35 stealth aircraft, which 
might, in turn, enable the Russians to get that information. 
Therefore, the United States has made it clear that Turkey should choose be-
tween the F-35 aircraft and the S-400 air defense system. In August 2019, Sec-
retary of Defense Mark Esper stated that “the Pentagon would consider al-
lowing Turkey to rejoin the F-35 program only if the Russian-made S-400 air 
defense system is completely removed from Turkish soil,” meaning that Turkey 
could not even keep the systems deactivated in warehouses.24
The deal with Russia jeopardizes Turkey’s security in the sense that, while the 
S-400s will be the grandeur of the Turkish Armed Forces, there is also the 
possibility that the Turkish Air Force capability may be decimated over time 
due to the sanctions exercised by the United States; these include, among other 
things, interdiction of the sale of at least 100 F-35 aircraft that were envisaged, 
The S-400 Triumph air 
defense system integrates 
a multifunction radar, 
autonomous detection  
and targeting systems, 
anti-aircraft missile 
systems, launchers and 




at the beginning of the project, to be 
bought by Turkey. 
In addition, Turkey’s existing F-16 
aircraft need to go through complete 
LRU (Line Replaceable Unit) checks 
for their advanced avionics programs 
and applications, as it is necessary to 
guarantee their reliable and determin-
istic communication and to obtain 
complete functional test coverage. 
Should the United States put the sanc-
tions into practice, it may not be pos-
sible to send these aircraft for testing 
due to the concerns that they may not 
be returned to Turkey, as has been the 
case with the two F-35s whose price had already been paid; these craft had 
passed the test flights with Turkish pilots, yet their delivery was halted by the 
Pentagon due to the controversy over Turkey’s decision to buy the Russian air 
defense system. 
To eliminate the possibility of such undesired situations, high-ranking civil 
and military officials as well as politicians and diplomats from both sides have 
gone through rounds of meetings in Ankara and in Washington to mend their 
differences with a view to putting the much-deteriorated Turkish-American 
relations back on track. Nevertheless, these deliberations have yet to produce 
tangible results. 
On the contrary, in July 2020, two Republican Congressmen, namely Adam 
Kinzinger (Illinois) and Michael McCaul (Texas) and a Democratic Congress-
woman Abigail Spanberger (Virginia) introduced legislation to impose sanc-
tions on Turkey over the purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense 
systems. The bill introduced by the U.S. Representatives, Countering Russia’s 
Export of Arms Act, “would designate this acquisition by Turkey as a signif-
icant transaction pursuant to Section 231 of the Countering America’s Ad-
versaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA),” the statement read. The United 
States has already seized six F-35 aircraft meant for transfer to Turkey.25
Impact of the S-400 Dispute on Developments in the Turkish Defense 
Industries
With all the pros and cons elaborated in the above sections, Turkey’s much-de-
bated air defense procurement process has frequently made the headlines in 
Given the four battalions of 
the S-400 that are reportedly 
purchased and the extent of 
the area each one is capable 
of covering, the strategic 
locations of major cities in 
Turkey as well as selected 
military installations, critical 
infrastructure and industrial 
sites could be effectively 
protected
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a wide range of media outlets, both at home and abroad, over the last decade, 
which has done indeed a great deal of service for the country’s fledgling de-
fense industries in many ways. 
First and foremost, the intense debate has attracted the attention of the Turkish 
people, particularly young pupils from all over the country, sparking a keen 
interest in defense-related matters more than ever. A growing number of Turk-
ish university students have in mind the goal of joining one of the companies 
operating in Turkey’s defense industry sector, such as Roketsan,26 Aselsan27 
or Havelsan,28 or starting their own. These young Turks constitute the hidden 
treasure of the country and hold great potential for the rapid progress of the 
Turkish economy in the coming decades.
Second, Turkish governments have become much more conscious than ever 
about the significance of supporting and thus sponsoring indigenous research 
and development projects in the field of defense industries. To illustrate, it is 
reported that Turkey’s external dependence in the industry has dropped to 30 
percent, down from over 70 percent in the early 2000s. While only 62 defense 
projects were carried out in 2002 with a budget of $5.5 billion, the number 
today has reached 700 with a budget of around $60 billion. The number of 
companies operating in the defense industry in Turkey rose from 56 to 1,500 
and the turnover of the sector hit $11 billion from just $1 billion in the same 
period. Similarly, Turkish defense and aviation exports, which amounted to 
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one day visit 
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Moreover, according to media re-
ports, seven Turkish defense firms 
were recently listed among the “De-
fense News Top 100,” published ev-
ery year by the U.S.-based military 
publishing company, Defense News 
magazine and based on the previ-
ous year’s defense sales. The mag-
azine compiles data from analysts, 
annual reports by companies and 
research conducted by the Defense 
News and the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies. These 
seven Turkish defense companies 
are Aselsan, Turkish Aerospace 
Industries (TAI), BMC, Roketsan, 
STM, FNSS and Havelsan, which 
ranked 48th, 53rd, 89th, 91st, 92nd, 98th 
and 99th on the list, respectively. While FNSS and Havelsan have entered the 
list for the first time, Aselsan joined the top 50 for the first time by moving up 
four spots.30
According to a statement issued by the Directorate of Communications of 
the Turkish Presidency on August 11, 2020, following the meeting of the De-
fense Industry Executive Committee of Turkey, which was convened under 
the chairmanship of President Erdoğan, Turkey will resolutely continue on its 
path toward a fully independent defense industry and various projects related 
to electronic warfare, cyber security, communications, weapons, ammunition, 
missiles and various platforms will be concluded in order to add new domestic 
and national systems to the ones already in use in the Turkish Armed Forces 
and security units. The statement also highlighted that many systems employed 
in recent operations successfully conducted within and beyond Turkey’s bor-
ders by the Turkish Armed Forces and security units were designed, developed 
and manufactured by the Turkish defense industry.31
It is also worth noting that one of the conditions of purchase of advanced air 
defense battalions was that Turkey wanted to be able to participate in the de-
velopment of the technology of whatever system it procured. If that is going to 
happen, to be able to learn from both NATO and Russian technology would be 
an additional potential benefit to the Turkish defense industry.
Hence, no matter how costly, in all respects, the S-400 deal might seem to 
be, the dispute between Turkey and its allies in the West must be approached 
from a wider perspective in order to assess the impact of the deal on Turkish 
While there is a lack of certainty 
about whether Russia will 
live up to its commitment 
to enable the S-400 to have 
such specifications, there 
are reports that Russia has 
already included a system 
(i.e., the interrogator) built to 
NATO standards to distinguish 
between friendly and hostile 
aircraft on the S-400 system it 
has sold to Turkey
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defense industries with respect to its vital contribution to the development and 
accomplishments of the essential instruments of national power, as well as to 
the making of the country’s foreign and security policies that will be elaborated 
in the next section.
Approaching the S-400 Dispute from a Wider Perspective
Turkey’s recent attempts to establish an effective air defense capability have 
been taking place in what can be observed as an interregnum of history.32 Un-
like the diplomatic comfort zone the Concert of Europe provided in the 19th 
Century, which established a set of principles and rules to maintain balance 
between the major powers after the Napoleonic Wars, or the clear-cut geo-
political playground of the Cold War period in the 20th Century, which was 
characterized by the threat of mutual annihilation due to the excessive stocks 
of nuclear weapons deployed within the opposing territories of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact countries, there exists no such a dominant order in the interna-
tional arena right now in the 21st century. There is no coherent, dependable 
paradigm that governs or constrains the behaviors of actors on the world stage, 
as nation-states, multinational corporations and non-state actors pursue their 
own immediate interests without being urgently concerned about coordina-
tion or collaboration with others. 
The functionality of preestablished alliances, pacts and leagues, most of which 
still remain nominally intact, are practically fading away. The old-fashioned 
East vs. West tension is giving way to a global decentralization of power, most 
visibly since the proliferation of populist politicians who began to come to 
the centerstage during the 2010s. Such populist figures do not readily observe 
the traditional boundaries in international affairs that prioritize legal norms, 
and moral and ethical values. Indeed, even the most well-institutionalized 
multilateral structures like NATO and the European Union are not immune 
to the consequences of rising populism. Even a brief survey concerning the 
statements and the actions of the leading figures at the helm of the governing 
bodies of these institutions would be sufficient to see the extent of the incon-
gruent objectives and policies that aim to pull and push these organizations 
to opposite, short-term-minded policy visions. Hence, the short-hand refer-
ence that would best describe the current “international political non-order”33 
might just be: “You’re on your own.” 
In the contemporary global geopolitical arena, each actor, big or small, rich 
or poor, may play a significant role in enhancing or diminishing the interests 
of other actors, including itself–often by way of entering into short-lived and 
ad-hoc collaborative interactions. In the absence of a long-term vision due to a 
lack of coherence among the perspectives of the leading powers that would also 
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streamline the behaviors of the remaining 
actors, one particular characteristic of the 
current international political non-order 
to bear in mind is that the fundamentals 
of the world stage have become very shaky 
due to the rapid changes in the decisions 
taken by a multitude of actors and in the 
decision-makers themselves. 
Consequently, global political actors are 
not only open to pursuing collaborative 
schemes with anyone available to do so, 
but also, within the same timeframe and setting, in any such deal, they may 
be in serious confrontations with the very same actors. Indeed, contemporary 
geopolitical actors are now increasingly observed to be simultaneously shak-
ing hands and smiling to cameras while also jabbing each other in the face and 
looking for a quick knock-out. There are plenty of vivid instances. A recent 
example is contemporary Russo-Turkish relations. Turkey and Russia shook 
hands for the sale of a highly strategic weapons system, namely the S-400s, 
while confronting each other on war terrain as both are pursuing diametri-
cally opposed policies with regard to the future of the regimes in Damascus, 
Syria and Libya. Similarly, Turkey and the United States, regarded as long-
time allies within the NATO framework, are making active contributions to 
the contingency planning capabilities of the Alliance and deploying mutual 
troops around the world to fight against international terrorist organizations 
such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, all the while pursuing highly incongruous policies 
in regard to terrorist organizations entrenched in the Middle East, particularly 
in Iraq and Syria, most prominently the PKK/YPG/PYD. 
Conclusion
It is clear, under the current international political non-order presented above 
and likely to persist in the foreseeable future, where no dominant paradigm 
exists, out of the instruments of national power and capabilities that help states 
pursue their national interest in the international arena, three stand out: intel-
ligence, diplomacy and the military-industrial complex. 
In rapidly changing situations on the world stage, where dozens of actors may 
change their positions, and thus their national interest calculus, on very short 
notice (e.g. within weeks, if not days) because of their impressions about the 
behaviors of other actors, it becomes highly crucial to anticipate the moves of 
other actors before they take effect due to the potential consequences that may 
either be detrimental or beneficial. Hence, intelligence services must, on the 
The higher the proportion 
of indigenous capability 
in defense industries, 
the higher the quality of 
actionable intelligence 
and the more precise the 
attempts in diplomatic 
demarches
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one hand, develop cutting-edge technological capabilities for routine remote 
sensing, surveillance and reconnaissance purposes, and build agile, flexible, 
potent, well-trained and well-equipped operatives so as to be up to the task of 
achieving such an objective.
Collecting timely and actionable intelligence is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for protecting the interests of a nation in this highly volatile inter-
national political environment. Thus the complementary role of diplomacy 
comes to the fore as an equally crucial instrument for states to be able to cap-
italize on the results of the successful intelligence gathering activities as well 
as to consolidate their political gains thereof, in accordance with the actual 
codes of conduct in the international arena. States whose diplomatic capabil-
ities are better than others, in terms of the caliber, skills and abilities of their 
diplomatic cadre, may pursue a more successful foreign policy and achieve 
their goals regardless of the size of their military capabilities and economic 
resources.
In addition to these tools is the crucial role of a military-industrial complex. 
A high-tech, up-to-date military base is clearly a vital element for enhancing 
and further advancing the achievements that the intelligence units and the 
diplomatic cadre reach through skillful work in coordination and collabora-
tion with each other. The extent of the capabilities and the degree of auton-
omy of the military industrial complex of a country determines the boundaries 
of the zone of operations of the intelligence units and the diplomatic cadre. 
The higher the proportion of indigenous capability in defense industries, the 
higher the quality of actionable intelligence and the more precise the attempts 
in diplomatic demarches. Thus, rather than any overriding international con-
sensus or a peace-making rule of law, the contemporary geopolitical game is 
played on a first-principles basis of the sweet science: “Hit, and do not get hit.” 
The S-400s may well serve this principle. Time will tell. 
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